National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in UK Merger Control by Kokkoris, I
Journal of Strategic Security 
Volume 14 Number 2 Article 3 
National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in UK Merger 
Control 
Ioannis Kokkoris 
Queen Mary University London, i.kokkoris@qmul.ac.uk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss 
pp. 47-73 
Recommended Citation 
Kokkoris, Ioannis. "National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in 
UK Merger Control." Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 2 (2020) : 47-73. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.2.1919 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized 
editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in UK 
Merger Control 
Abstract 
The article will discuss the boundaries of UK merger control set by national security 
concerns against the background of public interest considerations in the decisional 
practice of the competent authorities. The article will first present an overview of the 
existing legal framework for considering public interest when reviewing mergers and 
acquisitions in strategic industries or companies. It will then present the main precedents 
where issues of national security were raised and will discuss how the CMA and the 
Secretary of State assessed these transactions from both a competition and national 
security angle. Finally, the article will present the recent legislative initiative by the UK 
Government to extend national security grounds reflects a new approach towards FDI. 





As the multilateral approach to international trade has lost its appeal in 
recent years, foreign direct investments (FDIs) in strategic industries or 
companies are increasingly subject to non-competition scrutiny based 
on public interest considerations. While such considerations are not 
new to merger control, their potential to introduce or complement 
wider industrial policy or other priorities that are unrelated to 
competition law has brought them back to prominence in many 
jurisdictions across the globe. This trend is visible not only in 
developing economies, which have traditionally been more prone to 
protectionism, but also in the historical proponents of free and open 
market economy such as the United States and the European Union.1  
 
In 2018, the U.S. Congress adopted the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act, which was implemented immediately by the 
provisional Pilot Program to Review Certain Transactions Involving 
Foreign Persons and Critical Technologies.2 The reform expanded FDI 
review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) to include mandatory reporting of both controlling and 
noncontrolling investments in as many as twenty seven industries.3 At 
the same time, in the EU, following the European Commission’s 
(Commission) heavily criticized decision to block the Siemens/Alstom 
merger, there have been voices advocating for a formal procedure 
allowing the Council to override merger scrutiny based on non-
competition, public interest considerations.4 Even today, legitimate 
interests, such as public security, plurality of the media, and prudential 
rules, as well as other public interests that have been  approved by the 
Commission, may justify additional intervention by national 
authorities.5 
 
Similar screening mechanisms already exist or are being considered by 
many Member States with respect to transactions that are not subject 
to Commission review, which could lead to inconsistent enforcement 
and complex remedies, potentially exceeding the scope of the 
respective theory of harm and being used to achieve objectives of other 
policies such as trade. Recently, Hungary introduced a screening 
mechanism in January 2019, while Sweden and the Czech Republic are 
expected to follow suit. Overall, nearly half of the Member States have 
some form of public interest screening, either as part of the merger 
control assessment or within separate procedures on an ad hoc basis. 
Kokkoris: National Security as a Public Interest
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
 48 
This shows the increasing relevance of such mechanisms for legal 
enforcement and certainty amidst the increasing geopolitical tensions. 
Moreover, there are significant differences in scope and procedure:  
 
1. Ex-ante/ex-post assessment  
2. Voluntary/mandatory notification  
3. General/sectoral coverage  
4. Companies/assets coverage  
5. Applicability to investments from other Member States and 
third countries or third countries only, end the list.6  
To enhance transparency and provide legal certainty, without 
harmonizing national screening mechanisms, Regulation 2019/452 
established a procedural framework for cooperation between Member 
States and the Commission where an FDI in one or more Member 
States may affect the security or public order of another Member State 
or the EU.7 Given its limited scope, however, the Regulation neither 
requires Member States to apply public interest scrutiny to FDIs nor 
does it replace existing screening mechanisms with a European one-
stop-shop screening. Therefore, as this article will demonstrate, each 
jurisdiction still enjoys a closer look at specific public interest 
considerations, and indeed necessary, in the current state of 
international trade. 
 
In several jurisdictions, national security is one of the public interest 
considerations that is taken into account in the assessment of an 
acquisition or merger involving a foreign entity and domestic 
entity/assets. In terms of procedure, the threats to national security 
that a transaction may entail can be considered either by the competent 
competition authority, along the substantive competition law based 
appraisal of a merger, as in the United Kingdom (integrated model), or 
by another public body, such as a sectoral regulator or a government 
department, concurrently or subsequently to the competition 
proceedings as in the United States (dual model).8 The dual model is by 
far the most common, and interestingly, in Europe, Poland is the only 
jurisdiction where public interest considerations are assessed by the 
competition authority and no ministerial intervention is required. In 
terms of substance, some jurisdictions use precise and narrow 
definitions of public interest, while others prefer an open list of public 
interest considerations, or a broader, more flexible definition, leaving a 
considerable margin of discretion to the decision-making body. It is 




nevertheless possible to distinguish the following categories of public 
interest considerations:  
 
1. General and specific considerations (for example, in the 
energy sector: Security of supply and stable provision of 
energy)  
2. Economic (protection of small and medium enterprises) and 
non-economic considerations (protection of employment, 
environment or public health).9  
Given its frequent use, flexible meaning, and protectionist potential, 
national security stands out as one of the most controversial public 
interest considerations.10 This is more so in the UK, a jurisdiction with 
long experience in assessing concentrations pursuant to a public 
interest standard. It is worth noting that amidst complicated Brexit 
negotiations the recent government proposals on a new national 
security regime drastically lower the regulatory thresholds enhancing 
the national security scrutiny.11 
 
Historically, public interest considerations have been part of UK 
merger control since the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act. The 1973 
Fair Trading Act followed suit and introduced a broad public interest 
test based on five major public interest categories:  
 
1. Maintaining and promoting effective competition,  
2. Price, quality and variety considerations,  
3. Innovation, potential competition and reduction of costs,  
4. Balanced distribution of the industry and employment and 
finally  
5. International competitiveness.12  
In 2002, however, the Enterprise Act (EA 2002) used effective 
competition as the primary test for substantive appraisal of mergers 
and left little room for public interest considerations.13 Most recently, 
the government again reversed course and drastically lowered the 
regulatory thresholds to ease scrutiny of foreign acquisitions based on 
national security grounds. There are still several other public interest 
exceptions, whose examination could provide a clearer picture of where 
national security stands in UK merger control. 
 
This article will address, therefore, the boundaries of UK merger 
control set by national security concerns against the background of 
public interest considerations in the decisional practice of the 
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competent authorities. Accordingly, this article will first present an 
overview of the existing legal framework for considering public interest 
when reviewing mergers and acquisitions in strategic industries or 
companies. Next, it centers its attention on cases that have raised 
national security concerns, to outline the Government’s current 
approach to such concerns. Also, this article will discuss the 
ramifications of the recent legislative and policy developments that 
have significantly extended the leeway for national security 
considerations in UK merger control. As a final remark, it is crucial to 
indicate that despite the abundant literature in relation to the nature of 
national security as a public good and the implications the non-
rivalrous and non-excludable nature of a public good has for national 
security assessment, the analysis of such a topic falls outside the scope 
of this article. However, it is worth emphasizing the importance of 
public goods theory for the assessment of national security.14  
 
The Framework for Considering Public Interest in UK 
Merger Control 
 
Although the EA 2002 guarantees the primacy of a competition-based 
merger control in the UK, there are several public interest 
considerations which could justify a government intervention to block 
or conditionally approve a transaction. The grounds for and specific 
types of such interventions will set the stage for a more detailed 
description of institutional and procedural framework for considering 
public interest. The section concludes with a summary of the criticism 
that has been raised against this merger control framework. 
 
Grounds and Types of Public Interest Intervention 
 
Prior to the EA 2002, mergers in the UK were reviewed under a broad 
and imprecise public interest test, against which the relevant 
competition authority would only advise the Secretary of State on 
whether a transaction operates or may be expected to operate against 
the public interest.15 The Secretary of State would then make a final 
decision on how to remedy such adverse effects, including prohibition, 
structural or behavioral undertaking from the merging parties.16 While 
the concept of public interest did include competition considerations, 
and eventually only a few prohibitions were issued, the fact that from 
1973 to 2001 the Secretary of State disregarded the competition 
assessment and advice on thirty-one occasions, suggests that the then 




regime failed to provide much needed transparency and predicable 
outcomes.17 
 
Even though the so-called Tebbit doctrine would reverse this practice 
in 1984, making competition assessment the rule while almost 
completely ignoring the previously dominant wider public interest 
consideration, it was not until the EA 2002 that the UK introduced a 
formal merger control competition test - substantial lessening of 
competition (SLC).18 As a result, there is a clear line between 
competition concerns and public interest considerations in merger 
control. Furthermore, there is no room left for political intervention 
with respect to SLC assessment. Finally, it includes the following public 
interest as part of an exceptional intervention mechanism:  
 
1. Specific statutory public interest considerations  
2. The Secretary of State may decide new or additional public 
interest considerations, subject to subsequent parliamentary 
approval.19  
 
Currently, there are three statutory public interest considerations: 
National security, newspaper and media plurality, and the stability of 
the UK financial system.20 While national security was the only public 
interest consideration when the Enterprise Act was adopted in 2002, 
subsequent amendments completed the list with newspaper and media 
plurality and  the stability of the financial system.21 The latter is also 
the only public interest consideration to date that has been added by an 
order of the Secretary of State, during the review of the Lloyds/HBOs 
merger in 2008.22 Despite the cautious use of this power to include new 
or additional public interest considerations, its existence and rationale, 
besides saving time whenever necessary, have been criticized for 
limiting the extent and effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. As an 
illustration, it took the Parliament only 9 days to approve the new 
public interest concern in Lloyds/HBOs.23 
 
The Secretary of State may raise each of the three public interest 
considerations mentioned above during three types of public interest 
intervention. They can also be part of two groups depending on 
whether a competition-based merger control takes place in parallel. 
The competition authority reviews transactions involving a government 
contractor in the defense sector or newspaper/media companies which 
supply at least one quarter of the newspapers/broadcasting of any 
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description and meets neither the UK nor the EU jurisdictional 
threshold, and the Secretary of State may issue a Special Public Interest 
Notice (SPIN). However, the cease to be distinct test still applies to 
special merger situations.24 By contrast, where the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) or the European Commission are already 
investigating a merger, the Secretary of State may, depending on the 
case, intervene by issuing a Public Interest Intervention Notice (PIIN) 
or a European Intervention Notice (EIN). The former requires that a 
transaction constitutes a relevant merger situation, whereas the latter 
applies to a concentration with an EU dimension.25 
 
Figure 1. The UK Public Interest Merger Procedure (PIIN). 
Source: Author 





With respect to national security, redefining any of these jurisdictional 
concepts—by lowering the required turnover thresholds—can 
significantly expand the scope of merger control, typically in pursuit of 
non-competition policy goals, and allow for more frequent public 
interventions. However, as far as EIN are concerned, any public 
interest considerations which do not fall under the category of 
legitimate interests—public security, plurality of media and prudential 
rules—need prior approval by the European Commission.26  
 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that although the article focuses 
on the implications of public interest intervention based on national 
security concerns for merger control, it is possible that such a public 
intervention cloaks the trade policy implementation. This is not as 
evident in the UK as it is in other jurisdictions. For example, in 
response to the initiatives of foreign entity targeting in the United 
States, China’s Ministry of Commerce has also adopted the Provisions 
on the Unreliable Entity List which became law on 19th September 
2020.27 According to Article 1 of the law, it aims at safeguarding 
national sovereignty, security and development interests, maintaining 
fair and free international economic and trade order, as well as 
protecting the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises, other 
organizations, and individuals of China.28 A legitimate concern is that 
this list as well as the similar list the US government has published can 
be used as a legitimatized façade to impose sanctions on countries 
rather than entities themselves. The Qualcomm/Broadcom and 
NXP/Qualcomm transactions illustrate the impact that such policies 
can have on entities, as they became victims of the trade war and the 
broader geopolitical tensions between the United States and China.29 
 
Institutional and Procedural Framework of Public Interest 
Intervention 
 
In contrast to the paradigm shift it operated with respect to the 
substantive test for merger control, the EA 2002 essentially preserved 
the former institutional and procedural approach to public interest 
considerations. At the same time, it also seems to have given credit to 
the idea that public interest interventions are mainly political, hence 
biased, and arbitrary. Currently, the Secretary of State for Business, 
Energy, and Industrial Strategy—or, in the case of newspaper or media 
mergers, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport— 
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(Secretary of State) is at the center of an institutional and procedural 
framework which aims to ensure that public interests are duly 
considered whenever the competition appraisal of a merger might 
interfere with it. The Secretary of State must act in a scrupulously fair 
and impartial manner, in other words, in a quasi-judicial capacity. 
 
Following the 2013 reform, which abolished the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) and the Competition Commission and merged their functions 
into the CMA, the Secretary of State cooperates primarily with the 
competition authority to establish and remedy an issue of public 
interest during merger review.30 Occasionally, where a transaction 
concerns newspaper or media companies, the procedure also involves 
the Office of Communications (Ofcom), which would be advising on the 
public interest concerned in parallel to the competition assessment by 
the CMA.31 Either way, as far as public interest interventions are 
concerned, the communications regulator and the competition 
authority are tasked with gathering and analyzing input from various 
stakeholders, such as the competent ministry or government 
department and the industry concerned, which is then reported in a 
timely manner to the relevant Secretary of State. 
 
The procedure itself commences with the Secretary of State, either 
upon a recommendation from the CMA or sua sponte, issuing an 
intervention notice—a SPIN, a PIIN, or an EIN—that outlines the 
relevant public interest consideration(s) whenever he believes that it is 
or may be the case that one or more than one public interest 
consideration is relevant to a consideration of the relevant merger 
situation.32 Accordingly, either the CMA or the Ofcom proceeds to 
prepare a report in relation to the specified public interest and whether 
it might be at issue, based on feedback to a public interest test of the 
merger under review. Additionally, where a transaction falls under its 
jurisdiction, the CMA will present its Phase 1 conclusions on the 
competition assessment of the merger. Those conclusions should, in 
particular, address whether there is a relevant merger situation, 
whether the merger could result in a substantial lessening of 
competition, whether the markets concerned are of sufficient 
importance, whether the arrangements are sufficiently far advanced, 
whether there are outweighing benefits which offset the adverse effects 
of substantially lessening of competition, and whether it would be 
appropriate to deal with the matter by way of undertakings.33 By 
contrast, where a merger is being reviewed by the European 




Commission, the CMA has no competence to assess the competition 
aspects of the case; it can only deal with the public interest 
considerations specified in the EIN and make the appropriate 
recommendation to the Secretary of State. This initial phase concludes 
within a deadline set by the Secretary of State in its intervention notice, 
which is typically the statutory forty-day period for completing Phase 1 
assessment of all mergers. However, it is possible to reduce this period 
where necessary, considering the urgency of the matter for example, 26 
working days in Lloyds/HBOS.34 
 
At this stage of the procedure, in light of the CMA or Ofcom public 
interest reports, the Secretary of State may:  
 
1. Clear the merger, including where public interest outweighs 
any anti-competitive concerns  
2. Refer it to the CMA for an in-depth Phase 2 investigation  
3. Accept undertakings from the parties concerned in lieu of a 
Phase 2 reference.35  
While all public interest cases to date have resulted in undertakings 
addressing the Secretary of State’s concerns, the CMA may be required 
to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the relevant public interest 
consideration, even where there is no likelihood of substantial 
lessening of competition—the standard threshold for a Phase 2 
reference.36 In any event, the Secretary of State must accept the Phase 1 
competition assessment; he may disregard it in the name of a specific 
public interest, but cannot call it into question to trigger an in-depth 
inquiry. Thus, any anti-competitive outcome would be adverse to the 
public interest unless there is a relevant public interest consideration 
justifying it.37 By contrast, the Secretary of State can under no 
circumstance allow a merger to take place on public interest grounds 
where the European Commission has already prohibited it competition 
grounds. 
 
Phase 2 assessment of public interest considerations is similar to that 
of ordinary merger cases.38 The CMA Inquiry Group is in charge of 
reviewing the matter and preparing a detailed report within 24 weeks, 
which can be extended by another 8 weeks in case of special reasons.39 
Importantly, no new public interest consideration or such that has not 
been finalized by the end of the twenty-fourth week following the 
Secretary of State’s public interest intervention notice may be part of 
the in-depth inquiry. The Secretary of State may, however, delay a 
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Phase 2 reference until the public interest consideration is finalized at 
Phase 1 or, if earlier, 24 week period expires.40 The questions that need 
to be addressed during this inquiry include whether a relevant merger 
situation has been created or arrangements are in progress or in 
contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in the creation of 
a relevant merger situation, whether such a situation has or may be 
expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition, whether, 
taking account only of any substantial lessening of competition and/or 
the admissible public interest consideration or considerations 
concerned, the creation of that situation operates or may be expected to 
operate against the public interest, and most importantly, whether the 
Secretary of State or anyone else should take an action for the purpose 
of remedying, mitigating or preventing any of the effects adverse to the 
public interest which have resulted from, or may be expected to result 
from, the creation of the relevant merger situation.41  
 
Upon receipt of the CMA’s Phase 2 recommendations, which need to 
provide a comprehensive a solution as is reasonable and practicable to 
the adverse effects to the public interest, the Secretary of State has 
thirty days to decide whether to make an adverse public interest 
finding, or to make a no finding at all in the matter, thereby clearing 
the merger.42 A no-finding decision is warranted only where there is no 
public interest consideration which is relevant to a consideration of the 
relevant merger situation concerned.43 On the other hand, an adverse 
public interest finding enables the Secretary of State to take such 
actions that can reasonably remedy, mitigate, or prevent the adverse 
effects to the public interest, including where necessary the prohibition 
of the merger on public interest grounds. 
 
Overall, the UK public interest institutional and procedural framework 
represents a complex mechanism involving a regulator and a political 
decision maker. The CMA’s duty in Phase 1 is to collect, summarize and 
publish all representations from the relevant parties. In a Phase 2 
investigation, in contrast, the CMA has wide powers to investigate the 
public interest implications of the relevant merger case.44 In practice, 
some argue that the joint decision-making mechanism brings along a 
transparent process compared to a sole ministerial decision-making 
process due to the autonomous nature of the competition authority and 
that of its assessment.45  
 




Critical Assessment of the Framework for Considering Public 
Interest  
 
The institutional and procedural setting for considering public interest 
in UK merger control is not without criticism. One common line of 
criticism is that the CMA lacks extensive expertise in national security 
cases.46 Unlike media mergers, occasionally sent to Phase 2, thereby 
allowing the CMA to develop the necessary specialist expertise, those 
involving national security considerations are solved normally in Phase 
1 upon accepting measures from the parties concerned. Furthermore, 
the CMA’s role in balancing public interest and competition concerns, 
which is far from being a straightforward task, seems to run against its 
statutory duty to promote competition.47 However, it is important to 
bear in mind that, save for financial stability grounds, public interest 
considerations such as media plurality and national security do not 
require any balancing against competition assessment. In any event, 
since the CMA has no decision-making powers in matters related to the 
public interest, any balancing of conflicting considerations at stake falls 
upon the Secretary of State. 
 
A second line of criticisms points out the risk of political bias when the 
Secretary of State intervenes to review a merger on public interest 
grounds. For example, NewsCorp’s bid to acquire the remaining 60.9 
percent of the BskyB shares in 2010 was met with unprecedented 
skepticism, suggesting that the deal was problematic on political 
grounds, among others.48 While initial regulatory concerns revolved 
around cross-media ownership issues—NewsCorp was then the biggest 
newspaper company in the UK, accounting for one third of the whole 
market, and Sky was the biggest broadcaster—subsequent political 
scandals, which led to a public inquiry by Lord Justice Leveson, 
ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the bid. Also, the then SoS 
Vincent Cable stepped down because of a statement to some reporters, 
indicating that he had declared war on Rupert Murdoch just after he 
issued an EIN on 4 November 2010, and during the investigation a 
phone-hacking scandal emerged. Against this background, it was 
suggested that a greater involvement of the CMA in assessing public 
interest considerations would ensure more consistency and continuity, 
hence reducing the unpredictability of political decision-making.49 
However, no political decision is, in and of itself, predictable and 
perfectly transparent.50 Also, the lack of extensive Phase 2 experience 
with national security considerations in merger control, prevents the 
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CMA from ensuring a degree of consistency that would be welcome for 
the legal and business community. 
 
It is noteworthy that the above criticism does not apply equally to all 
three of the existing public interest considerations. While the current 
institutional and procedural framework seems best suited for dealing 
with financial stability concerns—mainly because the CMA has the 
enforcement capacity to effectively balance competition and financial 
stability consideration and that, given the importance of time in the 
finance sector, a final decision by the Secretary of State at the end of 
Phase 1 is preferable to a lengthy Phase 2 inquiry—national security 
cases might still raise several issues. First, a politically independent 
market authority such as the CMA appears to have little legitimacy to 
deal with national security matters. By contrast, such matters are less 
likely to create a conflict of interest involving political decision-makers. 
Furthermore, inadvertent disclosure of sensitive national security 
information to the CMA could itself pose a threat to national security. 
For example, in Hytera/Sepura the Home Office bypassed the CMA 
and presented directly to the Secretary of State about the security 
concerns with the transaction under review.51 Finally, there is always 
the suspicion that national security as a public interest consideration in 
merger control serves for the implementation towards a hidden 
industrial policy. 
 
The Assessment of National Security as a UK Public Interest 
Consideration 
 
Historically the first statutory public interest consideration in the UK 
and, occasionally, cast as something more than a public interest 
consideration, national security is also the most common ground for 
public intervention in merger control.52 By the end of 2019, the 
Secretary of State issued 2 SPINs, 2 PIINs, and 5 EINs to assess and 
remedy any adverse effects on national security. As table 1 illustrates, 
these cases include General Dynamics/ Alvis, 
Finmeccanica/AgustaWestland, Finmeccanica/BAE Systems, 
Lockheed Martin/Insys and General Electric/Smiths Aerospace.53 
While most of these public interest cases involve defense companies, it 
is worth noting that they also represent most of all mergers in the 
defense industry. 
 









Sector Concern Outcome 






Clearance / UILs 







Clearance / UILs 






Clearance / UILs 






Clearance / UILs 







Clearance / UILs 






Clearance / UILs 





























Given their number and increasingly frequent use—which is likely to 
become even more common following the lowered jurisdictional 
thresholds and the proposed reform discussed below –, public interest 
interventions on national security grounds deserve a closer look as they 
can give a better idea about how to understand national security and 
the application of such a concept in practice. Indeed, unlike the 
statutory definition which equates national security with the EU 
concept of public security, the decisional practice so far suggests that 
the interpretation of this public interest is narrow, encompassing 
concerns that are directly related to the UK’s national defense.  
 
The earliest decision regarding national security aspects as a public 
interest consideration under the 2002 Act relates to General 
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Dynamics/Alvis case.54 The case concerned the acquisition of Alvis that 
operated in the design, development, and production of armored 
fighting vehicles and military land systems business by a US-based 
General Dynamics which operated in aerospace, combat systems, 
information systems and technology and marine systems. The MoD, in 
this case, expressed two concerns: The maintenance of UK’s strategic 
capabilities and the protection of classified information. The Ministry 
firstly said that Alvis was the design authority for the British Army’s 
armored fighting vehicles. In that regard, the MoD said that it was 
unable to update the involved equipment without Alvis’s expertise. 
Secondly, the Ministry indicated that some of these capabilities related 
to highly classified technology and information. The SoS allowed the 
merger to proceed upon UIL’s from General Dynamics. The company 
undertook that it would continue to manage military programs which it 
is a contractor or sub-contractor. It also committed that it would 
ensure the continuity and development of its UK operations. Moreover, 
it agreed to operate in line with the UK National Security Regulations 
as regards the information security aspects of the classified 
information. The MoD stipulated that the company must appoint a 
compliance and a security officer and hold inspection powers that its 
representatives can use. 
 
The Finmeccanica/AgustaWestland case related to an acquisition by 
an Italian holding company, Finmeccanica, of a Dutch company, 
AgustaWestland, a joint venture comprising KN and Finmeccanica.55 
The MoD put forward the same concerns as it did in General 
Dynamics/Alvis case. The decision stated that AgustaWestland was 
the design authority for the UK Armed Forces helicopter fleet, and it 
has unique skills and knowledge regarding the said equipment. The 
parties had to give UILs, which were like those in General 
Dynamics/Alvis, to proceed with the merger. In a subsequent decision, 
there were similar concerns - Finmeccanica/BAE.56   
 
In the Lockheed Martin Corporation/Insys Ltd. case, the MoD stated 
that after the merger Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) there was 
an incentive to sell or transfer abroad the essential UK capabilities.57 
Moreover, MoD said that the transaction could raise concerns because 
LMC could have the incentives to complement and improve their own 
capabilities with Insys’s unique capabilities. The Ministry argued that 
combining information and technology without UK approval could 
have constituted a significant risk to UK security of supply due to the 




US International Traffic in Arms Regulations. In Gardner Aerospace 
Holdings/Northern Aerospace, in its advice to the SoS, CMA stated 
that the parties had undertaken to implement certain measures in 
cooperation with the MoD to satisfy the national security concerns 
raised by the Government in a related merger that took place before the 
proposed transaction. The SoS approved the case on those grounds.58 
 
In the General Electric Company/Smiths Aerospace case, the MoD 
identified a third concern: The transfer of ownership.59 The case 
involved the acquisition of a British company, Smiths Aerospace (SA), 
by a US-based company, General Electric (GE). The MoD stated that 
the said acquisition could enable GE to influence SA in a way that could 
affect the national security. This concern was also raised in Atlas 
Elektronik GmBH UK/Qinetiq's UWs Winfrith Division merger.60 In 
the OFT’s report, it was stated that the transaction could have 
compromised the independence and impartiality of research outputs 
and advice.61 The MoD’s confidence in the independence and 
impartiality of such outputs and advice was based on three factors:  
 
1. The fact that Qinetiq is not a major manufacturer or supplier 
of weapons systems 
2. Rigid compliance regime  
3. Government’s share in the company which offsets potential 
conflicts of interest. In that connection, MoD called the 
independence and impartiality of the merged entity into 
question as the company would favor its own products post-
merger.  
To address these specific concerns, the MoD stipulated that there 
should be firewalls between business compartments and that the 
merged entity must handle conflicts of interest that would conform 
with the published MoD commercial policy. 
 
Hytera/Sepura was the CMA’s first case raising national security 
concerns.62 This is the first intervention notice under Section 42 of the 
Enterprise Act that the Secretary of State has issued on national 
security grounds. The case concerned an acquisition by a Chinese 
company, Hytera, of the United Kingdom (UK-based Sepura. Sepura 
operated in the market for digital radios and related products for public 
sector and commercial customers. The Home Office put forward two 
concerns, namely protection of sensitive information and technology 
and maintenance of UK capabilities in servicing and maintaining radio 
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devices used by emergency services and other agencies in the UK. Of 
particular significance, the Home Office directly presented to the SoS 
some of the national security concerns relating to the acquisition. In 
that respect, CMA left any decision to propose remedies to the Home 
Office. The CMA’s competitive assessment focused on the products the 
parties currently produce, supply, distribute or service and on new 
devices in the parties’ pipelines or under consideration.63 Consistent 
with its phase 1 role, CMA did not provide any recommendations on the 
national security public interest consideration.64 The SoS referred the 
transaction to the CMA for a detailed Phase 2 investigation and the 
transaction was cleared with undertakings providing assurance that 
sensitive information and technology is protected and to ensure the 
repair and maintenance of the radio devices used by the emergency 
services in the UK.65  
Finally, in a recent acquisition which led to an EIN, Advent/Cobham, a 
private equity investor (Advent) was acquiring Cobham a provider of 
technology and services for the defense, aerospace, and space 
industries.66 The European Commission approved the transaction 
based on a simplified procedure and the SoS issued an EIN to allow for 
a full assessment for national security concerns. The CMA report to the 
SoS included a summary of the concerns the CMA received in relation 
to national security. According to MoD there were two main areas of 
national security concern arising. First, the potential for the parties to 
have access to information, either held on, or passing through, 
Cobham’s systems, which would allow unauthorized persons to 
understand either the detail of MoD capabilities or activity. Second, the 
extent to which the transaction posed a risk to existing MoD programs 
if the merged entity took decisions to exit from, underinvest in, or move 
offshore, the associate capability. According to the Home Office 
national security related to physical security in relation to company 
processes and premises, system security in IT systems, and personnel 
security in relation to employees and company management. Prior to 
approval, the SoS accepted undertakings to address the national 
security concerns. 
As the analysis of the above caselaw illustrates, a balancing exercise 
between national security considerations and competition 
considerations, would illustrate those competitive concerns could not 
overrule national security concerns. Therefore, there would be no 
balancing exercise with respect to these aspects as national security 
would always supersede competition law concerns. The challenge 




would therefore be to determine the procedural and substantial 
procedure of national security in a way that would create a sufficiently 
transparent, predictable, and certain environment for the businesses. 
The next part examines what the Government attempts to achieve in 
the recent legislative reforms. 
 
The Proposed Approach to National Security in UK Merger 
Control 
 
The UK’s traditionally strict approach to considering national security 
in merger control has gone through a major overhaul in recent years, 
arguably as a response to the rapid technological development which 
has enabled new, complex, and hard-to-detect threats. While this claim 
seems reasonable and in line with similar reforms in other developed 
countries, there is still a risk of overshooting the mark and winding up 
with a hidden industrial policy agenda, especially in the aftermath of 
Brexit. This section will critically assess the proposed shift in approach 
to national security in UK merger control by successively examining the 
rationale and scope of the reform, the extended merger jurisdiction and 
proposed remedies, and how this new approach would coexist within 
the existing legislation.  
 
Rationale and Scope (call in) of the Reform 
 
In 2017, the Government started a new consultation with the aim to 
broaden the concept of national security. Foreign direct investments 
(FDIs) were at the core of the Green Paper which the Government 
published in 2017. The Green Paper revealed that the Government was 
mainly concerned with espionage, sabotage and exerting of 
inappropriate leverage through such investments. In its White Paper, 
the Government stated that it intended to introduce a voluntary 
notification regime for national security concerns.67 It considered that 
there will be around 200 notifications each year within that 
framework.68 Within that framework, it designated a call-in power for 
the types of mergers which raise national security concerns.69 Of 
particular significance, the Government considered to remove national 
security grounds from the 2002 Act,  detaching the CMA from the 
assessment process to make it more efficient.70 The Government stated 
that it further aimed to preserve the independence of the CMA.71 
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Considering the current proposals, that national security is not only 
about the core defense sector anymore.72 It also includes now restricted 
goods and advanced technology. The Hinkley Point C and 
Softbank/ARM cases were illustrative of that point.73 In Hinkley Point 
C, the Government allowed the development of a nuclear power station 
by a partly French state-owned EDF and fully state-owned CGN.74 In 
Softbank/ARM, the chip-maker’s acquisition by the Japanese company 
was approved by the Government along with commitments.75 It is 
worth noting that both cases would be scrutinized under the proposed 
national security regime. 
 
The scope of national security is explained in a draft statutory 
statement of policy intent (the Policy Statement) published together 
with the White Paper,76 which states that the mechanisms described in 
the White Paper are limited to national security as distinct from either 
the national or public interest but acknowledges that the Government 
does not attempt to define the term precisely.  According to the Policy 
Statement, national security risks may be raised by entities due to the 
nature of their activities and by assets due to their nature (and in the 
case of land, due to the nature or location of the land). National 
security threats may include acts of terrorism or actions of hostile 
states related to cyber-warfare, supply chain disruption of certain 
goods or services, disruptive or destructive actions or sabotage of 
sensitive sites and espionage or leverage. 
 
Extended Jurisdiction and Proposed Remedies  
 
The Government proposed short-term and long-term reforms to 
address these issues. In short term, it proposed to lower the turnover 
thresholds for:  
 
1. Dual use and military use sector  
2. Parts of the advanced technology sector.77  
 
In 2018, by an Order which is still before the Parliament, the 
Government proposed changes in these respective areas.78 The Order 
focuses on two respective areas:  
 
1. Restricted goods  
2. Advanced computing.  
 




For the longer term, the Government proposed an expanded scrutiny of 
FDIs by putting in place a notification regime that would cover a 
broader range of FDIs.79 
 
The new regime would allow the review of a far wider range of 
transactions than existing legislations. There are a number of trigger 
events that may be reviewed on national security grounds (for example 
the acquisition of significant influence or control over an entity or 
asset).80 If a trigger event is either contemplated or in progress, the 
parties to the transaction may make a voluntary notification to the 
Government. Parties may enter into informal discussion with the 
Government about specific trigger events. Where a trigger event is 
notified, the Government will ask for detailed information about the 
trigger event (including its purpose and expected date) and the 
acquirer (including details of other investments). The Government 
would undertake a preliminary screening review lasting 15 working 
days, which may be extended for an additional 15 days for complex 
cases. It would then decide whether to call in the trigger event and the 
decision to call in a trigger event would be made public.81 Completed 
transactions could be called in within six months.82  
 
The Government has the power to call in a trigger event if the parties 
choose not to notify it, provided the statutory call-in test is met. This 
test has two limbs which are based on reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a trigger event has occurred or is in progress or contemplation; 
and that the trigger event may give rise to a risk to national security. 
The factors the Government may consider when exercising the call-in 
power include the target risk (areas of the economy where the 
Government considers national security risks are more likely to arise), 
the risk for the trigger event to give rise to national security risks; and 
the risk that the acquirers may raise national security concerns.83  
 
In the event that the Government is assessing a trigger event that has 
already taken place, once it has been called in, parties must not take 
any further measures that increase the acquirer’s control, nor take 
steps that would make it more difficult for the trigger event to be 
unwound. The Government may impose additional interim restrictions 
(limited to the prohibition of either the sharing of specific information 
or access to specified sites) where relevant.84 The Government would 
have up to 30 days to assess any trigger event. If it is determined that 
there is a risk to national security and that further consideration is 
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necessary, the period may be extended by up to an additional 45 days.85 
The Government may impose conditions for the approval of a 
transaction if it believes a national security risk is posed and the 
respective remedy is proportionate to that risk, and there is no other 
more adequate and proportionate power available for the Government 
to exercise.86 
 
The White Paper describes the new criminal offences and civil 
sanctions for breaches of requirements to be introduced by the 
Government, which may be in addition to more flexible administrative 
penalties (such as director disqualification).87 A maximum custodial 
sentence of five years will be available for most offences. Breaches of 
information-gathering powers will attract lesser sanctions. Civil fines 
could also be imposed (up to 10 percent of worldwide turnover for a 
business, or up to 10 percent of total income (or £500,000, whichever 
is higher for an individual). Finally, judicial scrutiny of substantive 
decisions would be limited to strict judicial review grounds in which 
case courts cannot supplant ministers’ decisions, considering that they 
are directly accountable to Parliament.88 
 
Under the proposed changes to the UK national security regime, 
decisions on the national security review of foreign investments would 
be separate from competition assessment and would not involve the 
CMA as is the structure now. Decisions would instead be taken by a 
Cabinet-level minister (Secretaries of State, the Chancellor, or the 
Prime Minister). The proposed new regime is similar in many ways to 
the CFIUS regime in the United States. The CFIUS, established by an 
Executive Order in 1975, is an interagency body, which consists of nine 
Cabinet members, comprising the Departments of the Treasury (chair), 
Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, and 
the Offices of the US Trade Representative, and Science & Technology 
Policy. 89  The Secretary of Labor and the Director of National 
Intelligence serve as ex officio members, with roles as defined by 
statute and regulation.90 The official notification and review process 
starts with the filing of a voluntary notice by the parties to a proposed 
transaction.91 CFIUS, based on a risk-based analysis of the national 
security threat posed by a transaction, has the authority to negotiate, 
impose, or enforce any agreement or condition with the parties in order 
to mitigate any threat to US national security.92 CFIUS may initiate a 
45-days-investigation of the transaction, that could be extended for an 
additional 15 day period under extraordinary circumstances.93 If a 




CFIUS member recommends that the transaction be prohibited, or 
CFIUS believes that a Presidential determination is appropriate, it may 
refer the matter to the US President, who has 15 days to decide. The 
President is under no obligation to follow the recommendation of 
CFIUS to suspend or prohibit the transaction. The President must 
conclude that other US laws are inadequate or inappropriate to protect 
the national security, and he/she must have credible evidence that the 
foreign investment will impair the national security.94 
 
Aspects of the UK economy that are particularly likely to give rise to 
national security risks, include core national infrastructure sectors (the 
civil nuclear, communications, defense, energy, and transport sectors); 
certain advanced technologies (including computing, networking and 
data communication, and quantum technologies) are similar to the 
critical industries that fall within the scope of the CFIUS regime as 
discussed above. The type of trigger events that may be reviewed on 
national security grounds is similar to the concept of covered 
transaction defined by the US FINSA.95 Finally, the judicial scrutiny of 
substantive decisions is a welcome feature as it contributes to 




The article established when deciding on national security concerns 
and M&A transactions raise, the UK Secretary of State seems to enjoy 
unlimited discretion. In this sense, if a transaction potentially creates 
national security concerns, it is crucial that the parties have the ability 
to predict the outcomes of the competent authorities’ and decision 
makers’ assessments based on the analysis of transparent factors. 
Otherwise, it is very likely that the process becomes uncertain and 
unpredictable. 
 
This article discussed how national security concerns have been 
addressed in the assessment of transactions by the CMA and other 
competent authorities. Unsurprisingly, concerns that relate to national 
security have usually arisen in transactions that relate to the 
military/defense sector. By the end of 2019, the Secretary of State 
issued 2 SPINs, 2 PIINs, and 5 EINs to assess and remedy any adverse 
effects on national security. However, the focus has changed in the 
recent years, and the types of sectors where transactions can induce 
national security concerns has expanded. This is exemplified in the 
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recent legislative initiative by the UK Government to extend national 
security grounds reflects a new approach towards FDI in various 
sectors. It also shows that the concept of national security is broadened 
to include critical infrastructure and advanced technologies. As the 
proposals in that respect would potentially affect a wide range of 
markets where dual-use of the facilities or technologies are involved, 
transparency and effective judicial review are of utmost importance to 
provide certainty and safety.  
 
It also seems to be a positive step to remove CMA from the 
aforementioned process of assessment of national security concerns 
since the sole ministerial decision-making could decrease the level of 
bureaucracy. It is noteworthy that the CMA has itself outlined its role in 
the assessment of transactions raising national security concerns. It has 
stated repeatedly that the CMA is not expert in national security 
matters and therefore, in Phase 1, it only summarizes the 
representations made to it.96 Nonetheless, the CMA does provide 
advice on features which might, in general, strengthen the effectiveness 
of any suitable remedies. 
 
In the longer term, the UK government intends to follow the example of 
other developed countries and make more substantive changes to how 
it scrutinizes the national security implications of foreign investment. 
The reforms have a particular focus on ensuring adequate scrutiny of 
whether significant foreign investment in critical businesses raises any 
national security concerns and providing the ability to act in 
circumstances where this might be the case. The expectation is that the 
need to act would be relatively rare, but the risk that this can turn into a 
tool to implement industrial policy considerations does exist.  
 
The initiatives by many jurisdictions to extend national security focus 
reflects a suspicion towards FDIs masking other geopolitical interests. 
These concerns, in part, are covered by the UK governments by their 
aforementioned steps to implement a new national security 
framework.97 It is important to emphasize that as Stephan has 
suggested, retaking broader political interference based on public 
interest grounds might undermine the consistency and certainty of the 
merger control process.98 To conclude, the national security 
assessment process will benefit from transparency, well defined 
concepts, clear structure of the reviews, accountability and speed. 
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